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AGENCY
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
No significant questions of agency law were decided by the
Supreme Court during the survey period, although one or
two of the decisions for the first time declare and apply in
this State generally accepted principles of common law.
1. Authority Express and Implied; Wife's Authority. Bar-
ber v. Carolina Auto Sales' explored the authority of a wife
to make contracts for her husband. In this case a Fort Jack-
son serviceman, temporarily assigned overseas, left in his
wife's possession a car registered in his name. During his
absence, and "without his knowledge or consent," 2 she traded
the car for a later model which she registered in her own
name, but on his return, the husband repudiated the trans-
action. The husband then brought an action for conversion
by the sales agency of the old car; the t-ial court non-suited
his action, but the Supreme Court reversed. The wife con-
cededly had no express authority to trade the car, nor could
actual authority be implied "from necessity"3 or emergency.
The Court then held, in accordance with prevailing law, that
a wife is not her husband's agent merely by virtue of her
marriage,4 although, of course, it may be shown that he in
fact made her his agent. But mere absence does not create
the agency, nor does the wife's possession, without more, of
her husband's property empower her to sell.5 Finally, the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 236 S. C. 594, 115 S. E. 2d 291 (1960).
2. Id. at 596, 115 S. E. 2d at 292.
3. Id. at 598-599, 115 S. E. 2d at 294.
4. Cf. Moses v. Fogartie, 2 Hill 335 (1834), where the husband was
not liable for goods purchased by his wife without his knowledge or con-
sent.
5. But c. Gore v. Whiteville Lumber Co., 110 S. C. 474, 96 S. E. 683
(1918), a suit for trespass on plaintiff's real property where the husband
was owner of real estate, but had been absent for some twenty-three years,
leaving his wife in possession of the land. Holding that she had such
possession, the Court said, "The sole question is whether [the wife] had
such interest in and possession, actual and constructive of the land." Hold-
ing that the wife had a sufficient possessory interest in the land to main-
tain trespass, the Court alternatively held (semble) that the husband's
long absence would of itself, "raise such presumption of her agency as
will enable her to maintain such actions as may be necessary or proper
to protect it against the invasions of trespassers," so that "his possession
.. . is her possession." 110 S. C. at 480. In Barber, the Court recognized
this rule of law, but relied on Corpus Juris rather than Gore to sustain
the proposition.
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Court ruled that it is not usual and customary for a wife
to be vested with such authority in her husband's absence.
Since no special presumptions or rules are applicable, the
agency relationship, if any, must be determined from the
facts and circumstances of the case.
6
2. Apparent Authority. ZIV Television Program v. As-
sociated Grocers of South CardliniW reversed a trial court's
determination that, as a matter of law, the agent had ap-
parent authority to bind her principal to sponsor a series of
television programs, and ruled that the evidence was suffi-
ciently conflicting to require a jury determination. Here some
seventy or eighty retail grocers, in order to purchase large
quantities of food at lower prices than individual retailers
could obtain, formed a purchasing association which employed
a Miss Burford. Some twenty or thirty member retailers
also operated under a trade name, "Topper Stores," and
jointly advertised bargains at their stores. From time to
time, Miss Burford assisted them in an advertising program
for which the Topper Stores paid her additional compensa-
tion. Negotiations between the TV sponsor and Miss Burford
resulted in a claim that she had obligated the association to
sponsor a TV series, although the association claimed that
she had no authority, to take such action and that she acted
only for the Topper Stores. The Court ruled that there was
evidence of apparent authority - testimony of general con-
fusion between the two organizations, that advertising bills
were paid by the association, and that the association had
referred the TV producer to Miss Burford as the advertising
manager. Contrary evidence disclosed no prior dealings be-
tween the association and the TV producer, and that the
association was organized only to buy in bulk and did not
advertise. Although the Court stressed estoppel as the basis
of apparent authority, it is obvious that the estoppel element,
even on the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, is much
attenuated in this case, and that the term is used loosely to
justify letting the jury speculate on the evidence. Although
estoppel features are often present, the real justification is
6. In Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 493 (1960), the
Court reaffirmed the rule established by previous cases that in contract
cases the complaint need not allege that an agent executed the contract,
since for this purpose the agent is identified with the principal and the
agent's act within the scope of his authority, actual or apparent, is of
itself enough to bind the principal.
7. 236 S. C. 448, 115 S. E. 2d 826 (1960).
2
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broader and more basic - to give effect to the reasonable
expectations and understandings of persons in their business
and their transactions.
3. Ratification. Although in the Barber case,7a the Court
found no basis in the record for attributing to the wife
authority to trade her husband's car, there was a "close"
jury question as to ratification of the unauthorized transac-
tion, and it was on this basis that the trial court's judgment
of non-suit was reversed and the case remanded for new
trial." Following his return from overseas, the husband de-
manded that his wife drive him to West Virginia to see his
ill and apparently neglected children, and the new car was
used on this trip. Since the trip was one almost of necessity,
the new car was the only one available, and the husband
started divorce proceedings against his wife in West Virginia,
any "enjoyment" of the car, both in the lay and law sense,
was absent, and consequently the husband's use of the car
under these circumstances was not, as a matter of law, "ac-
quiescence" in the wife's unauthorized trade. Thus it was
for the jury to make the determination of ratification vel non
as a matter of fact.9
4. Duties of Agent to Principal; Discharge. In Freeman
v. King Pontiac Co.,' 0 primarily important for its rulings on
corporation law, the president and chief shareholder of a
close corporation discharged the vice-president for refusing
to dismiss a suit filed by the latter in the name of the cor-
poration. In holding that the discharge did not violate the
vice-president's contract of employment, the Court applied
the settled rule of agency law" that disobedience is a proper
ground for firing an agent and that the president's demand
that the suit be dismissed was authorized by the corporation's
by-laws and was not unreasonable in view of the proven im-
portance of the matter to the corporation.
5. Master-Servant and Independent Contractor. The only
case involving master and servant during the survey period
7a. Supra, note 1.
8. 236 S. C. 594, 599, 115 S. E. 2d 291, 294-295 (1960).
9. The factual aspect of the Barber case is nicely highlighted by the
Court's discerning distinction of a closely parallel Georgia decision in
Southern Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Krieger, 86 Ga. App. 574, 71 S. E.
2d 884 (1952) which inferred ratification as a matter of law from closely
similar fact circumstances.
10. 236 S. C. 335, 114 S. E. 2d 478 (1960).
11. Mitchell v. Toale, 25 S. C. 288 (1886).
[Vol. 14
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is Hunter v. Hyder,'2 in which the Supreme Court affirmed
a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in trespass against
a defendant for cutting and removing timber from the plain-
tiff's land. The Court held that the pleadings sufficiently
charged a tort committed by the defendant's servants, there-
by passing the question whether proof of tortious conduct
by defendant's servants fatally varies from a complaint al-
leging misconduct by the defendant himself,'- finding no
variance between a complaint alleging tortious conduct by
one servant and proof of misconduct by another.14 The Court
also sustained the action of the trial court in sending to the
jury the conflicting evidence as to whether the trespass was
committed by defendant's servants or by an independent con-
tractor.
12. 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 493 (1960).
13. See Richey v. Southern Ry., 69 S. C. 387, 48 S. E. 285 (1904).
14. See note 6, supra, for the Court's recognition that a complaint in a
contract case need not allege execution of the contract by an agent.
1961]
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